Alternate Endings — Ten Hypothetical Events That Would Have Changed the Outcome of World War Two

By George Dvorsky

Decisions during wartime are monumental things. Each move and countermove has the potential to change the course of history. Here are ten shocking ways the Second World War could have unfolded differently than it did.


1. Germany Invades Britain Instead of the Soviet Union
Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 proved to be his undoing, but it didn’t have to play out the way it did. After the fall of France a year earlier, the Fuhrer had his military chiefs come up with a plan for an assault on the United Kingdom, an operation dubbed Sea Lion. Preparations began in earnest in the summer of 1940; by the autumn, the British were convinced that an invasion was imminent. What’s more, with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact securely in place (a treaty of non-aggression between Germany and the U.S.S.R.), Hitler didn’t have to worry about a war with the Soviets; Stalin was content with his share of Poland, and had his sights set on Finland.

But Hitler soon nixed the plans to conquer England. For starters, it became painfully obvious that more time and preparations were needed. The Fuhrer also knew that an invasion in 1940 would be risky. Britain’s navy controlled the Channel, and as the Battle of Britain revealed, the Luftwaffe didn’t own the skies. What’s more, Hitler wanted to attack Russia sooner rather than later.
But what if the Nazi dictator delayed his conquest of Russia until 1942 or 1943? Germany might have continued its air assault on Britain while sustaining its naval blockade around the Isles. Then, after an appropriate period of preparation, an amphibious landing could have hit England’s shores in 1941 or even 1942. With Britain knocked out of the war, Germany could have finally headed east into the Soviet Union unencumbered.

Had Sea Lion succeeded, a likely scenario would have seen the British government and monarchy flee to Canada. From there, working with the Americans, the Allies could have planned for an invasion of Africa, which in turn might have led to incursions in Italy and the Balkans. What’s certain, however, is that it wouldn’t have been easy — especially if Germany’s subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union had gone Hitler’s way.


2. Japan Reconsiders Attacking Pearl Harbor
The isolationist movement in the United States was alive and well in 1941. Certainly American voters were divided on war. But with Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was free to initiate hostilities against the Axis.

Japan’s fateful decision to confront the United States stemmed from its need to secure oil and rubber reserves from the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia. Had the empire not attacked Hawaii, Tokyo’s expansionist policies would have likely crossed United States eventually, say, after an invasion of the Phillipines. Japan needed to hobble the mighty American Pacific fleet before it could snatch up territory.

But for argument’s sake, let’s assume that Japan didn’t bomb Hawaii and the U.S. were never given a reason to declare war. In such a scenario, Britain and her colonial allies would have been isolated. America’s support for both the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. would have been limited. The Churchill would have struggled in Africa, likely never gaining the opportunity to invade Sicily or Italy. No Western Front would have emerged. The Soviet Union would have probably still defeated Germany, but it would have taken considerably longer. And under those conditions, Stalin just might have claimed all of Europe for himself after crushing the Nazis. 


3. The Germans Take Moscow in 1941
A longstanding debate among historians is whether or not Operation Barbarossa could have actually succeeded. The Nazis certainly committed a number of fatal mistakes during the invasion, including a 38-day delay in starting the attack — time that would have certainly come in handy at the onset of winter. And then there was Hitler’s catastrophic decision to divert the main thrust away from Moscow southwards to help Army Group South capture Ukraine. By the time Army Group Centre reached the outskirts of the Soviet capital in early December 1941 — a teasingly close distance of 15 miles (German soldiers could actually see the spires of the Kremlin) — winter had arrived with a vengeance, literally freezing Hitler’s plans to take the Russian nerve centre.

This was perhaps the deciding moment of the Second World War. The struggle certainly would have turned out quite differently had the Soviet Union fallen. First, it would have knocked a significant military power out of the fight. And once armed with Russia’s vast resources (including the oil regions to the south and the breadbasket regions of Ukraine), the Third Reich would have converted into the autarchy of Hitler’s fantasies. Nazi Germany would have become the global superpower, eventually defeating Britain, claiming all of the Middle East and quite possibly even linking up with Japanese forces in Asia. Berlin would have certainly developed nuclear capabilities, perhaps kindling a Cold War with the United States.

Frighteningly, the Nazis would have succeeding in murdering all the Jews and Romani of Europe. And through the diabolical Hunger Plan, they would have also starved tens of millions of Slavs to death, “cleansing” the occupied territories of its inhabitants. It would have been a humanitarian catastrophe of the highest order, possibility setting the stage for a totalitarian dark age. 


4. Russia and Germany Make a Separate Peace
Imagine a scenario in which both Hitler and Stalin came to a mutual agreement to cease hostilities on the Eastern Front. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact restored, Germany could focus all its efforts on defeating Britain. This one’s a bit of a stretch for at least two reasons. First, Germany desperately needed Russia’s oil reserves to continue its war effort. Second, Stalin would have been hesitant to allow Germany to continue running roughshod around Europe; the Third Reich would continue to pose a serious existential threat to the U.S.S.R. Still, the possibility that this could’ve happened is quite frightening. 


5. The Nazis Develop the Bomb Before the Allies
Given Hitler’s penchant for so-called “wonder weapons,” there’s little doubt he would have used the atomic bomb if he had it. This is the same regime, after all, that developed a precursor to the intercontinental ballistic missile. The Nazis even used mosquitoes as biological weapons.
It very well might have been lights-out for the Allies had Germany come up with the nuclear weapons first. It could have resulted in victory for Germany on all fronts. Mercifully, the Nazis never appreciated the potential for a weapon that was so closely associated with “Jewish science.” 


6. No Western Front
Had it been up to Winston Churchill, there would have been no Western Front opened. With memories of the bloodbath in Flanders still haunting him, the British prime minister was resistant to launch an amphibious attack on France, preferring instead his “soft underbelly” strategy of attacking Axis powers through Italy and the Balkans. But with the United States asserting itself, Churchill and the British military had to take a back seat to American planners. Hence the attack on Normandy in June 1944.

Of course, Stalin also demanded a Western Front — not only to offset the terrible losses being incurred by the Red Army (Stalin would later say, “You paid with your steel, we paid with our blood”), but to also prevent rival Allied forces from establishing a foothold in Eastern and Central Europe. He was already looking ahead to the post-war world and the creation of a communist bloc.

But had Churchill gotten his way, it’s likely that an exceptionally strong Allied invasion of both Italy and the Balkans would have occurred. Alternately (or in supplemental fashion), an invasion force could have come through Norway, which is why Hitler insisted on stationing over 400,000 troops there over the course of the entire war (even as Berlin burned). The complexion of the war would have been vastly different, with the bulk of anti-Axis forces coming from the east and south. It’s difficult to predict what might have happened next, but a German defeat could have still been likely. Though it’s interesting to think about France’s fate given such a scenario. 


7. The July 1944 Plot to Assassinate Hitler Succeeds
The 20 July, 1944 plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler resulted in tragedy on multiple levels. Not only did it fail in its primary objective, but it led to the capture of 7,000 people, of which 4,980 were executed. Worse, it retrenched and further radicalized Nazi party. Called Operation Valkyrie, the conspiracy was organized by Wehrmacht officers who wanted Hitler out of the picture so Germany could negotiate a separate peace with the western Allies and continue the war against the U.S.S.R. It’s highly unlikely, however, that Washington and London would have gone for it (recalling Roosevelt’s infamous “unconditional surrender” speech — and the fact that the Big Three already had an agreement ruling out a separate peace under any circumstances).

There’s been much debate over what might have happened had Hitler been killed in the war’s final year. It’s unlikely that his death would have resulted in the collapse of the Nazi party or the Axis war effort. Even Claus von Stauffenberg, a leading member of the Valkyrie plot, accepted that he would “go down in German history as a traitor.” Indeed, despite the sorry state of the war, the cult of personality surrounding the Fuhrer was surprisingly resilient.

Had the plot been successful, however, a likely scenario would have seen either Hermann Göring or the fanatical Heinrich Himmler ascend to the lead Germany. Both would have had the plotters captured and executed and the Nazis would have probably continued the war. A Third Reich under new management might have surrendered earlier, sparing Germany the cataclysm that was to befall it in 1945.

Another possible scenario is that the death of Hitler could have kick-started a more vociferous internal resistance movement — one that might have led to civil war. But owing to widespread German patriotism, this scenario is quite improbable. 


8. Stalin’s Red Army Continues West After Taking Berlin
By the time the Battle of Stalingrad had ended in 1943, the eventual outcome of the war was no longer in doubt: Germany was finished. Stalin’s Red Army persistently pushed the Wehrmacht back towards Germany, gobbling up territories that would later form the Iron Curtain. But as historian Anthony Beevor noted, Stalin —for a brief time — seriously considered taking all of Europe for himself. And he might have been able to do it, despite the fact that Russia was importing copious amounts of material and equipment from the U.S. (Russian soldiers were eating American canned food and driving in Jeeps and Studebaker trucks). After the fall of Berlin, the Red Army consisted of 12 million men spread across an astounding 300 divisions. Meanwhile, the western Allies had barely 4 million men making up only 85 divisions. By V-E Day, the Americans were still several months away from developing the bomb — enough time for the Soviets to push the Allies back to the English Channel. What would have happened after that, with the advent of the bomb, is anyone’s guess. 


9. Churchill Immediately Starts World War III
On the flip side of this alt-history coin, we also seriously need to consider Churchill’s Operation Unthinkable — the plan for the start of a new war against the Soviet Union after the fall of Nazi Germany. Like Stalin, Churchill had anticipated hostilities after a European victory and wondered if there was no better time to wage World War III than the present. But cooler heads prevailed. The Red Army stopped at Berlin and Eisenhower never considered taking on the Reds (unlike his compatriate, George Patton). 


10. The Allies Invade Japan Instead of Dropping the Bomb
The bombs were dropped on Japan because military experts presented President Truman with projections showing millions of U.S. casualties by the time Tokyo surrendered (the figures were based on casualties incurred during the fight for Okinawa). Had Truman refused to drop the bomb, Operation Downfall would have been put into effect — the largest amphibious campaign in human history.

The two-part invasion was set to commence in October of 1945. Operation Olympic would have seen the capture of the lower third of the southernmost main Japanese island, Kyushu. Then, in spring 1946, Operation Coronet would hit the Kanto Plain, near Tokyo. Airbases on Kyushu captured in Operation Olympic would have allowed land-based air support for this second phase of the attack. In total, 30 divisions would have been required. In response, the Japanese were preparing for an all-out defense of Kyushu. Had it gone down, it would have been a bloody mess.
_______________________
George Dvorsky is a Canadian based bioethicist and the producer of the podcast Sentient Developments. He penned this piece for the futurist daily news site i09. MilitaryHistoryNow.com would like to thank Mr. Dvorsky for granting us permission to reprint it. Follow him on twitter @dvorsky.

7 Bizarre World War Two Mysteries Involving Nazi Germany

7 Bizarre World War Two Mysteries Involving Nazi Germany - Urban Ghosts

The Second World War touched almost every corner of the globe, left an estimated 70 million people dead and countless families shattered. The events of what is considered to be the deadliest conflict in human history have been well documented and, 70 years later, remain seared into the public consciousness.

The Tornado Bomb

Zippermeyer Wirbelwind Kanone.

Dr. Mario Zippermayr, an eccentric Austrian inventor working at an experimental establishment at Lofer in the Tyrol, designed and built a series of highly unorthodox anti-aircraft weapons that were observed very closely by the Reichsluftfahrtamt (Office of Aeronautics) in Berlin. Due to the overwhelming numerical air superiority of the Allies every effort was made during the last year of the war to find ways of exploiting any known phenomenon that could bring down the heavy bombers of the USAAF and RAF. Dr. Zippermayr constructed both a huge Wirbelwind Kanone (Whirlwind Cannon) and Turbulenz Kanone (Vortex Cannon). Both had the same goal – to knock down enemy bombers through clever manipulation of air.


To achieve this, the “Wind Cannon” used a detonation of hydrogen and oxygen to form a highly compressed plug of air that was channeled through a long tube that was bent at an angle and fired like a shell towards enemy aircraft. Impossible as this may seem the Wind Cannon did particularly well on the ground – breaking one inch thick wooden boards from a range of 200 yards! This promising development, however, meant nothing against the Allied bombers that were flying at 20,000 ft! Nevertheless, taken from the Hillersleben Proving Grounds the Wind Cannon was used in defense of a bridge over the Elbe River in 1945. Either there were no aircraft present or the cannon had no effect because it was still intact where it was found.


The Turbulenz Kanone, by comparison, was a large caliber mortar sunk into the ground with fired coal dust and slow burning explosive shells to create an artificial vortex. This also worked well on the ground but again the problem was the same – how to generate a large enough effect to reach the aircraft. Zippermayr did not know if the pressure changes of this device would be sufficient to cause structural damage to an aircraft but the vortex would definitely have an effect on the wing loading as even clear air turbulence had brought down civilian airliners.


Even though Zippermayr could not make either of these weapons any more potent, three outcomes came from his research. The first was the coal dust shell application used with light artillery in the Warsaw Ghetto which involved nothing more than shortening the barrel of the artillery piece and detonating the shells in flight. The improvised weapon was named “Pandora” and was sadly used to deadly effect against the Jewish freedom fighters.


#


A special catalyst had been developed by the SS in 1943 and the following year Zippermayer turned his energies to a heavy air (Schwere Luft) bomb. Encouraging results were obtained from a mixture consisting of 60% finely powdered dry brown coal and 40% liquid air. The first trials were carried out on the Döberitz grounds near Berlin using a charge of about 8 kg powder in a tin of thin plate. The liquid air was poured on to the powder and the two were mixed together with a long wooden stirrer. The team then retired and after ignition everything living and trees within a radius of 500 to 600 metres were destroyed. Beyond that radius the explosion started to rise and only the tops of trees were affected, although the explosion was intense over a radius of 2 kilometres.
Zippermayer then conceived the idea that the effect might be improved if the powder was spread out in the form of a cloud before ignition, and trials were run using an impregated paper container. This involved the use of a waxy substance. A metal cylinder was attached to the lower end of the paper container and hit the ground first, dispersing the powder. After 0.25 seconds a small charge in the metal cylinder exploded, igniting the funnel-shaped cloud of coal dust and liquid air.


The ordnance had to be filled immediately prior to the delivery aircraft taking off. Bombs of 25 kgs and 50 kgs were dropped on the Starbergersee and photographs taken. SS-Standartenführer Klumm showed these to Brandt, Himmler’s personal adviser. The intensive explosion covered a radius of 4 kilometres and the explosion was felt at a radius of 12.5 kilometres. When the bomb was dropped on an airfield, destruction was caused as far as 12 kilometres away, although only the tops of trees were destroyed at that distance, but the blast flattened trees on a hillside 5 kilometres away.


These findings appear in the British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee Final Report No 142 Information Obtained From Targets of Opportunity in the Sonthofen Area. Although one suspects initially that the radius of the area allegedly affected as described in this report had been worked upon by the Propaganda Ministry, the fact is that this bomb is never heard of today. Furthermore British Intelligence published the report without comment and what tends to give the description weight is the fact that the Luftwaffe wanted aircrews flying operationally with the bomb to have knowingly volunteered for suicide missions. The idea that the bomb had unusual effects was hinted at not only by the head of the SS-weapons test establishment but also possibly by Goering and Renato Vesco. On 7 May 1945 in American custody, Goering told his captors, “I declined to use a weapon which might have destroyed all civilization”. Since nobody knew what he meant, it was reported quite openly at the time. The atom bomb was not under his control, although the Zippermayer bomb was. Vesco reported that the supreme explosive was “a blue cloud based on firedamp” which had initially been thought of “in the anti-aircraft role”. On the Allied side, Sir William Stephenson, the head of the British Security Coordination intelligence mission stated:


“One of our agents brought out for BSC a report, sealed and stamped This is of Particular Secrecy telling of liquid air bombs being developed in Germany of terrific destructive power.”


A 50 kg bomb was said to create a massive pressure wave and tornado effect over a radius of 4 kms from the impact point, a 250 kg bomb for up to ten kms. A sequential disturbance in climate for a period after the explosion was reported. Radioactive material added to the explosive mixture was possibly to give it even better penetration and distribution. Zippermayer’s device fits the idea of a high pressure bomb which Professor Heisenberg seemed to know about and to which he alluded in his eavesdropped conversation at Farm Hall. The bomb would have been the equivalent of a tornado but covering a far wider diameter, sucking up in its path everything but the most solid structures and scattering radioactive particles over the wide area devastated by the initial explosion. The survivors of the explosion would be suffocated by the lightning effect at ground level burning up the surrounding air.


The head of the SS-Weapons Testing Establishment attached to the Skoda Works was involved in the destruction of the catalyst at the war’s end. He had personally witnessed it being tested at Kiesgrube near Stechowitz on the Czech-Austrian border. These must have been the first tests, since he describes the astonishment of the observers at the force of the blast and tornado effect.


Various other smaller tests were carried out at Fellhorn, Eggenalm and
Ausslandsalm in the Alps. After these a larger experiment was made at Grafenwöhr in Bavaria described by the SS-General in the following terms: “We were in well-constructed shelters two kilometres from the test material. Not a large amount, but what power -equal to 560 tonnes of dynamite. Within a radius of 1200 metres dogs, cats and goats had been put in the open or below the ground in dug-outs. I have seen many explosions, the biggest in 1917 when we blew up a French trench complex with 300,000 tonnes of dynamite, but what I experienced from this small quantity was fearsome. It was a roaring, thundering, screaming monster with lightning flashes in waves. Borne on something like a hurricane there came heat so fierce that it threatened to suffocate us. All the animals both above and below ground were dead. The ground trembled, a tremendous wind swept through our shelter, there was a great rumbling, everywhere a screeching chaos. The ground was black and charred. Once the explosive effects were gone I felt the heat within my body and a strange numbness overcame me. My throat seemed sealed off and thought I was going to suffocate. My eyes were flickering, there was a thundering and a roaring in my ears, I tried to open my eyes but the lids were too heavy. I wanted to get up but languor prevented me.” An area of 2 kilometres was utterly devastated. Several observers on the perimeter were seriously affected by the shock wave and appeared to suffer from a kind of intoxication effect which lasted for about four weeks. That the weapon failed to make its debut on the battlefield in 1943 arouses the suspicion that very real fears existed regarding its knock-on effect on the climate. Within sight of Gernany’s defeat, it was tested again at Ohrdruf in the Harz in early March 1945.

If France Kept Fighting: How World War II Might Have Gone Very Differently

Robert Farley

September 4, 2016

France surrendered to the Nazis in 1940 for complex reasons. The proximate cause, of course, was the success of the German invasion, which left metropolitan France at the mercy of Nazi armies. But the German victory opened profound rifts in French society. Instead of fleeing the country and keeping up the fight, as the Dutch government and a residue of the French military did, the bulk of the French government and military hierarchy made peace with the Germans.

But what if key figures (such as Marshal Philippe Petain) had viewed the situation differently?  If the French government had decided to go into exile in the Empire, rather than re-establish itself in the German protectorate at Vichy, then the rest of World War II might have gone very differently.

The Military:
France had extensive assets available to continue its resistance against the Axis powers. The French Fleet was the most notable of these; France possessed two of the world’s most modern fast battleships, numerous powerful cruisers and destroyers, and a host of support vessels. Had the French acted with any speed to the success of the German Ardennes offensive, this fleet could have evacuated a substantial portion of the French Army to Britain and to North Africa, possibly with much of its equipment intact.

In Allied service, these ships could have helped hem in the Italian Navy, and cut Axis supply lines to Africa.  Against Germany, French squadrons could have hunted raiders, driving the Germans to the Arctic even before the entry of the United States. And when war came to the Pacific, the Fleet could have deployed in defense of French Indochina and other French possessions, as well as giving critical support to the Royal Navy. For their part, the Army and Air Force could have contributed to the war in the Mediterranean, the defense of Greece, and to resistance against Japanese encroachment in French Indochina.

The Empire:
In Africa, while we can assume that the problems that bedeviled French-British operations in France would have persisted, the continued resistance of the Empire would have put Italy in an untenable position. Italy struggled to supply Libya when faced with just the British; the presence of the French fleet, as well as an active military threat in Tunisia, would have made it very difficult for the Axis to sustain operations in Africa.

Given the lukewarm Italian enthusiasm for the war in the first place, a concerted Franco-British offensive in the Mediterranean might have pushed Italy out of the conflict early, or at least curtailed Rome’s contribution to the Eastern Front. If Mussolini persisted in foolishly declaring war on Greece (as might have happened in case of the loss of Libya) French and British forces together could have sustained a serious Greek war effort, although probably not enough to hold off the Germans.

In the Pacific, Japan occupied French Indochina (first in part, and then wholly) because of the collaboration of the Vichy regime.  Had the French government remained at war with Germany, authorities in Indochina would have had both the means and the motivation to resist Japanese advances. Unless Tokyo was willing to risk an early war with the British (and possibly the Americans), it would have needed to seize French Indochina in the first days of its December 1941 offensive, which would have significantly delayed Japan’s larger offensive into Southeast Asia.

On the Other Hand…
The biggest reason that many French decided to collaborate with the Nazis was fear of what Germany would otherwise do to occupied France. To be sure, the Germans took great care in 1940 and 1941 to assure the French of their (relatively) benign intentions. At the same time, the Germans looted what was left of the French military and the French treasury, funding the Nazi war machine as it undertook campaigns against Britain and the USSR. Still, France mostly avoided “Polanisation,” the complete destruction of the national unit that the Germans carried out in the East.

Without a Vichy, the situation might have gone much worse for France, especially if the military continued an effective resistance from the Empire. The Germans always found some collaborators, and whether or not the French government continued to resist, some local authorities would have cooperated with the Nazis. But conditions in the occupied portions of France were worse than in Vichy, especially for those (Jews and political opponents) specifically targeted by the Nazi regime. In the south, Mussolini’s Italy might have been able to carve away a bigger chunk of France that it eventually took control of.

The availability of French territory in Africa might have made both Franco and Hitler more amenable to each others’ entreaties, although much would depend on how effectively the French and the British fought Italy. At the extreme, persistence of French resistance in Africa might have forced Hitler to delay his invasion of the Soviet Union, although even in this case Germany lacked much in the way of means to bring the British and French to heel.

Parting Thoughts:
Many Frenchmen (led most notably by Charles de Gaulle) maintained an honorable resistance to the Germans, even after the armistice. By 1944, a strong resistance movement in metropolitan France was supported by the infusion of large numbers of troops from North Africa and elsewhere. So, as was the case with Poland, France did continue to fight, even after defeat.

Nevertheless, the eventual course of World War II put an especially bad light on the decision of the French military and political hierarchy to cease resistance against Germany. Even without foreknowledge of the German disaster in Russia, however, the French had meaningful means to resist Germany, and to continue to put pressure on the Nazi regime. The refusal of the bulk of the French government to continue the war, if under disadvantageous circumstance, undoubtedly extended the suffering of the European continent.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.

This Naval Battle Could Have Changed the Course of WW2

If the Battle of the Philippine Sea had played out differently, Japan’s navy might have been decimated by June 1944.

The battle involved 15 American aircraft carriers deploying some 900 aircraft on one side and nine Japanese flat-tops with about 450 planes on the other. When the smoke had cleared, three Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers lay at the bottom of the sea, with barely over 30 aircraft left on the decks on the remaining six flat-tops . In stark contrast, the U.S. Navy did not have a single flat-top sunk or damaged and suffered combat losses of 30-odd planes.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea is one of the largest naval encounters of World War II, but has often been overshadowed by other more illustrious fleet-on-fleet clashes of that particular conflict, especially the Midway and Guadalcanal campaigns preceding it, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf following it. The June 19-20, 1944 engagement is the last of the five carrier-versus-carrier clashes of the Pacific War, and it came about as the IJN sallied forth to contest Operation Forager – the American amphibious assault on the Mariana island of Saipan on June 15.

Controversy
The battle that ensued is arguably more noted for the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” of June 19, 1944; what is less often mentioned is the fact that the commander overseeing Forager – Fifth Fleet’s Admiral Raymond Spruance – has since been severely castigated for his caution during the battle. On the night of June 18-19, he received conflicting information that made him believe that his adversary was aiming for an “end run” so as to attack the beachhead at Saipan. He therefore chose to have the fast carrier component of the Fifth Fleet – the powerful Task Force 58 (TF 58) – covering Saipan. This resulted in a large proportion of the Japanese Mobile Fleet running away to fight another day – with potentially deleterious consequences four months later during the Leyte operation.

The controversy in the decades since the Battle of the Philippines Sea has revolved around these questions: Was Spruance too cautious? Should the Americans have gone westwards toward the Mobile Fleet instead of letting the Japanese come at them? This then begs the question: What if Spruance had been more aggressive and sent TF 58 after the Mobile Fleet on June 19? Would the subsequent battle have changed the course of the war?

Who would be able to attack first?

It is worth noting that even if Task Force 58 sought battle with its Japanese counterpart on the 19th, the latter would still be in a position to attack first as per the actual event. This was because Japanese carrier aircraft, with a range of over 300 miles, had much longer “legs” than the American ones, which could optimally hit targets 200-250 miles out. Moreover, Japanese reconnaissance capabilities were superior, and this meant that the Mobile Fleet was likely to find and attack TF 58 first, but not the other way round unless the Americans launched a truly vigorous search effort, as well as made significant headway toward the enemy during the night of June 18-19.

How would the aerial battle pan out?
Hence even if Spruance were to pursue the enemy from the start, the Mobile Fleet, by virtue of its longer aerial striking reach, would still be able to keep its adversary at arm’s length in the early stages of the June 19 encounter, and this would be the state of affairs until the Americans could close the distance between them and the Japanese.

This then raises the question of whether the so-called Turkey Shoot would have occurred. The climactic aerial battle of June 19, 1944 happened largely because Task Force 58 were solely focused on defense that day. Had the Americans gone after the Mobile Fleet instead, it is conceivable that the aerial battle that ensued would not be as dramatic. After all, TF 58 would then have had to split its aircraft between the combat air patrol (CAP) and attacking the Mobile Fleet.

Furthermore, in terms of the CAP, the Americans had to deal with not just enemy carrier-based planes, but land-based ones from nearby Japanese-held islands like Guam.

Notwithstanding this, the qualitative disparity between Japanese and American aviators as well as aircraft would still point to a decisive victory in the air for the United States. To illustrate, in June 1944, the average U.S. naval aviator had at least 525 hours of flying time compared to his Japanese counterpart’s 275.

Moreover, the American Hellcat outclassed the IJN’s mainstay “Zeke” fighter. That being said, American aircraft losses in combat would admittedly be much higher than the 30-odd actually incurred on the 19th.

Would U.S. carriers be sunk?
Because of the diversion of resources to offense, esteemed naval historian Samuel Morison maintained that some American carriers would have been sunk had Spruance been more aggressive on June 19. This is highly debatable as U.S. flat-tops would – coupled with superb damage-control capabilities – later prove themselves to be extremely sturdy platforms in the face of the suicide aircraft threat. Indeed, only a single American fast carrier – USS Princeton during the Leyte operation – was sunk by enemy action during World War II.

Having said that, the prospects of the Mobile Fleet attaining “mission kills” of TF 58 flat-tops were also limited, to say the least. To be sure, the Japanese achieved a number of “mission kills” vis-à-vis U.S. fast carriers later in the conflict, but it is worth noting that these were attained via the “precision-guided” kamikaze. Considering the parlous state of Japanese carrier aviation in June 1944, it would have needed a very healthy dose of luck for the Mobile Fleet to get in more than a few hits on TF 58 via the conventional mediums of dive- and torpedo-bombers in order to get mission kills on the U.S. carrier force.

A more complete victory
By the time Task Force 58 got into a position to attack the Japanese, it is conceivable that the American force would have repelled a number of air strikes, severely weakening the Mobile Fleet’s aerial capabilities. And if TF 58 could strike its adversary on June 19, 1944, it is likely that the Battle of the Philippine Sea would be discussed by historians in the same vein as other overwhelmingly decisive naval encounters, like the Battle of Salamis or the defeat of the Spanish Armada. In other words, the Battle of the Philippine Sea would not be an incomplete victory a la the Battle of Jutland, where the British let the bulk of the German surface fleet escape unscathed.

Indeed, in this hypothetical encounter, the Mobile Fleet – or at least most of its heavy units – would probably be decimated by Task Force 58’s carrier planes. After all, while TF 58’s sole strike on the Mobile Fleet that occurred on the 20th was relatively haphazard, the attack nevertheless yielded a commendable return of fleet carrier Hiyo sunk, Pearl Harbor veteran Zuikaku and battleship Haruna heavily damaged. Had TF 58 attacked its adversary a day earlier, the Japanese would arguably have suffered much heavy losses given that the Americans would be able to execute multiple strikes on June 19 and thereafter.

All that being said, hypothetical U.S. strikes on June 19 would likely have severely damaged many enemy ships, but not sunk them outright. This is because the Americans seemed to have imbibed the wrong lessons from their crushing victory at the Battle of Midway. In that encounter, four Japanese flat-tops were dispatched to Davy Jones’ Locker largely due to bombs, and the U.S. Navy would set great store on the use of bombs in the anti-shipping role thereafter. This was evidenced in the fact out of the 54 Avenger torpedo planes involved in the actual June 20 attack on the Japanese fleet, only a few carried torpedoes while the rest toted four 500-pound bombs each.

Postulating from this, it is highly conceivable that any U.S. strike during the 19th would, too, have focused on the use of bombs rather than torpedoes. While bombs are effective in their own right, they are not as ideal a weapon for the anti-shipping role compared to torpedoes. This is because unless the bomb detonates in the enemy ship’s magazine, it does not cause as much catastrophic damage – especially structural – unlike its underwater counterpart. Bearing this in mind, hypothetical American attacks of June 19 would have damaged several Japanese vessels and slowed them down, leaving the way for the “black-shoed” – read: surface warship-centric – Spruance to send in his surface component to deliver the coup de grace.

Possibility of a surface battle
It is worth noting that an encounter of this nature took place four months later during the Battle of Cape Engano, one of the constituents of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. There, Admiral William Halsey deployed a cruiser-destroyer unit against Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Northern Force after the latter had been seriously weakened by carrier air attacks. Thus with various Mobile Fleet units damaged and rendered less maneuverable by bombs, the way would be paved for Spruance to deploy his beloved “heavies” against the cripples of the Japanese navy. As a matter of fact, he had on hand a total of seven modern battleships, including two of the powerful Iowa-class vessels, for an old-fashioned surface slugfest. Count the two Yamato-class super-dreadnoughts amongst the Japanese cripples, and the stage would be set for the salivating encounter that has fascinated naval enthusiasts in the decades since the end of the Pacific War.
Concluding thoughts

More than 70 years have passed since the Battle of the Philippine Sea and World War II aficionados are still debating Spruance’s decision on message boards and other platforms. The battle broke the back of Japanese naval aviation and concomitantly that of the IJN as well. However, critics argue that while the battle was decisive, it was “not decisive enough” as most of the Japanese surface fleet escaped to fight another day.

All in all, it can perhaps be argued with at least a fair degree of certainty that a more aggressive Spruance during the Battle of the Philippine Sea would bring about a “more decisive” outcome and herald the death knell of the Imperial Japanese Navy four months earlier. The Japanese fleet thus decimated, there would be no Battle of Leyte Gulf. And suffice it to say that with the need to wrestle for sea control gone, the U.S. carrier force could then focus on power projection overland.

The interesting question then would be to what extent could U.S. war plans against Japan be accelerated. It follows that the world might be a different place today had Admiral Raymond Spruance done things differently on June 18-19, 1944. But until the day a time machine is invented and the admiral can be forewarned of the repercussions his decision would bring about, the question of “What if Spruance had been more aggressive during the Battle of the Philippine Sea?” will always remain one of the most intriguing counterfactuals of military history.

Ben Ho Wan Beng is a Senior Analyst with the Military Studies Programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and has published with the likes of The Diplomat, USNI News, and The National Interest. While contemporary naval affairs are Ben’s main research interests, World War Two naval history will always have a special place in his heart as it reminds him of his childhood days reading up on, among others, the Battles of the Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Cape Esperance, and Bismarck Sea. 

Alternative Operation Eclipse

 

An LPS bonus mini-game, On To Berlin is a 2-player game tactical / operational simulation of the hypothetical last battle of WW2, code-named Operation Eclipse. This is a variant of Fortress Berlin that assumes the Allies launched an airborne assault (3 US and 3 British divisions) on Berlin in March 1945. On To Berlin is not a complete game by itself as it requires ownership of Fortress Berlin.

It depends on WHEN the drop was done. Let's assume the Yalta accords go as per Original Time Line [OTL] but without any explicit talk re Berlin. 

Anglo-American armies smash across the Rhine in March but are hampered by the Pocket of the Ruhr (which OTL resisted till 17-18 April). On the 9th of April the first US troops of the 9th Army begin reaching the Elbe near Magdeburg. Historically, they stopped there. Let's say they stop there FOR THE MOMENT BEING. On the 15th of April the 101th and 82th US Airborne and the 6th British Airborne are dropped on Berlin's airports and western outskirts after devastating heavy bomber raids by some 1,300 planes. Their objective is the capture of Adolph Hitler and his staff, after which they are to retire westwards; meantime, the 9th Army attacks with full force across the Elbe with its armored forces, objective linking with the XVIIIth Army Corps dropped in and around Berlin. 

I therefore think of an operation to capture Hitler and his entourage, not to conquer Berlin Festung. I also think it would fail, though, because Hitler would have killed himself rather than being taken prisoner in the Reichskanzlei.

Ben Bova's Triumph deals with such an attack. I believe that he accurately portrays the fact that the majority of the Volkssturm and Wehrmacht forces would have surrendered to the US forces, while the SS and other elite regiments would have fought to the death.

The window of opportunity turned out to be very tight. The Soviet offensive started on April 16th and it would have been a logistical nightmare to have Americans AND Russians fighting the Germans in and around Berlin. 

The 9th Army reached the Elbe near Wolmirstadt on April 11th but faced resistance in front of Magdeburg from German 12th Army under Wenck who had recently taken up a defensive posture. In OTL, the crossing of the Elbe on April 12-13 wasn't straightforward and indeed one bridgehead had to be abandoned as the Americans came under sustained German fire. 

So, where to land the 101st Airborne? Brandenburg, some 20 miles west of Berlin or Potsdam, much nearer the German capital? Perhaps the experience of Market Garden would have installed some caution and Brandenburg was some 40 miles from the Elbe bridgehead - though over much more favourable country than Holland. 

If the 101st lands at Brandenburg in the early hours of April 15th 1945, they could capture the town and secure it. The 9th Army still faces hard fighting at Barby and elsewhere but can make it through to link with the paratroopers within 72 hours - April 18th. 

By then, the Soviet offensive has smashed through to the Seelow Heights and is overwhelming fanatical German opposition. Cautiously, the Americans advance toward the western outskirts of Berlin but meet resistance from SS forces at Potsdam on April 20th by which time advance Russian elements have reached the east of the city which is coming under Soviet artillery fire. 

With Koniev's troops outflanking the city to the south, the Americans take Potsdam and reach Spandau on April 22nd. A force of tanks moving toward Charlottenburg comes under Soviet artillery fire and 5 American tanks are destroyed. By now, the Americans are besieged by hordes of refugees fleeing the city but opt not to advance further than Spandau. On April 24th, Soviet and American troops meet at a number of points near the western outskirts of Berlin. By now, the Russians are well to the north and south of the city. 

Stalin invites the Americans to "join with your allies in destroying the lair of the fascist beast" on April 25th and the city is soon squeezed from all sides with thousands of refugees fleeing into the American lines. On April 27th, the Americans are at one end of Unter den Linden, the Russians at the other but it is the Russians who capture the Reichschancellery on April 28th 1945.

The German Commander in Berlin, Reymann, surrenders the city a day later. Earlier that day, Hitler commits suicide with Eva Braun. Goebbels is captured by the Russians but Bormann is captured by the Americans - both will eventually hang at Nuremberg.

The plans included more than the 101st--probably the 82nd and from what Stefano said the 6th British as well. This would give the western allies more power than only one division.

Overall it would have been a bad plan. Eisenhower supposedly argued against the proposed zone division lines, but once they were set he based his plans on them. 

At best, an airborne drop would have been a sacrifice of American and British troops to capture ground for the Soviets. More likely the mission would have been a more extreme version of Market-Garden; airborne troops sent to far behind enemy lines and used against too well defended a target. The casualties would have been horrendous (especially if the Red Army held back as it did at Warsaw and allowed the Germans time to destroy the paratroopers).

You, know, come to think of it, I'd probably drop the Polish Airborne to capture the big symbolic buildings. If not for the symbolism of how Germany started the war by invading Poland.

Anyway, here are some of the Units of the US that could have been used for a drop on Berlin: 

The 13th Airborne

17th Airborne

82nd Airborne

101st Airborne

The various Ranger Divisions

I'm sure the OSS could do something internally

Also, other allied troops:

Canada had two Parachute brigades

The Free Polish Parachute brigade

The British Airborne Units

The plan according to Cornelius Ryan’s the final battle was to drop the paras on the airfields. After securing those the allies could fly in tanks.

American Paratroopers Fighting in Berlin

It seems to me this is highly improbable.  On May 7-8 1945, some 60,000 airborne troopers were deployed in the ETO as follows: - XVIII Airborne Corps (Ridgeway) at Hagenow, Germany – 82nd Airborne Division (Gavin) at Ludwigslust, Germany - 101st Airborne Division (Taylor) at Berchtesgarden. - 17th Airborne Division (Miley) near Essen in the Ruhr. - 13th Airborne Division. Standby at Auxerre, France - 501 PIR (Ballard) and 508 PIR (Linquest) both at bases in France for possible POW camp jumps.

Except for the emergency air resupply missions to the 101st at Bastogne. Lewis Brereton's big and expensive FAAA had achieved nothing of consequence since MARKET-GARDEN, in September. There had been no para- troop operations; in the Bulge and thereafter. the four parachute divisions had been committed to ground action. The opening of Antwerp as a supply port in November had eliminated the need for using FAAA's fourteen-hundred-odd air transports for carting gasoline and ammo to the continent. The FAAA staff and its vast aerial resources were going to waste. FAAA, however, continued to generate plans. Most of these were designed to support Montgomery. Bradley or Patch in crossing the Rhine River into Germany, but one-ECLIPSE (formerly TALISMAN)-was an American drop on Berlin. should the Third Reich suddenly collapse. Just prior to the Bulge. the airborne plans for crossing the Rhine had been reduced to three, in this order of priority: VARSITY (in support of Montgomery’s crossing at Wesel); CHOKER II (in support of Patch's Seventh Army crossing at Worms); NAPLES II (in support of Bradley’s crossing at Cologne).

On the evening of March 7.  when Bradley telephoned Eisenhower to first report the capture of the Remagen bridge, Eisenhower was at dinner at his new headquarters in Rheims. His guests for the evening were most of the principal airborne commanders: Ridgway, Doc Eaton, Gavin, Taylor and Gerry Chapman, commander of the newly arrived 13th Airborne Division. Eisenhower had summoned them to discuss future proposed airborne operations: CHOKER II, ECLIPSE, and a brand-new, huge and spectacular operation called ARENA." 

In their war memoirs. Gavin and Taylor both vividly recalled Bradley's mid- dinner phone call announcing the capture of the Remagen bridge, and the excitement it created. Ridgway, however, did not mention the incident in his memoir.  Perhaps it was a moment he did not care to remember.  If XVIII Airborne Corps had not been pulled out for VARSITY, against his wishes, it would have been his forces-not Millikin’s-which captured the Remagen bridge, and Ridgway and XVIII Airborne Corps would have had the great privilege of exploiting the bridgehead with Joe Collins and VII Corps. Moreover, having been present when Eisenhower authorized Bradley to exploit the bridgehead, Ridgway knew that the whole course of the war was going to change, that the real push would now come in the center and that Montgomery's Rhine crossing-and VARSITY-would become an over staged side-show. " 

When the excitement had died down, the talk at Eisenhower’s dinner re- turned to a discussion of future airborne operations, with the focus on ARENA.  Conceived by FAAA’s fecund planning staff, it fulfilled George Marshall and Hap Arnold's long-standing desire for a big and decisive strategic airborne operation deep in enemy territory.  During  Max  Taylor's  visit to Washington  in  December, Marshall had once again urged such an operation. According to Taylor, Marshal had “damned without stint” Montgomery’s MARKET-GARDEN and had been "emphatic in speaking about the 'timidity’ of our [airborne] planning." Marshall's idea of “proper airborne operations," Taylor reported, was still “to seize an air head and then pour in large quantities of troops." Now that the Allied armies were drawing up to the Rhine and Germany appeared to be tottering toward collapse, FAAA believed that the opportunity (and good flying weather) had finally arrived when a strategic airborne operation could be mounted. " 

Breathtaking in size and scope, the plan for ARENA abandoned the conservative, newly adopted "one-lift" doctrine. Initially a force of four to six Allied airborne divisions, brought in by multiple lifts, would seize an airhead about a hundred miles east of the Rhine in an area of high ground lying between Paderborn and Kassel. In that area there were three well-organized and comparatively undamaged German airfields and numerous outlying land- ing strips. These would be utilized to fly in four or five more regular infantry divisions, making a total FAAA force of about ten divisions.

The airborne army thus assembled deep inside Germany might be given several principal missions depending on the battlefront situation. It could at- tack westward toward the Ruhr, helping Montgomery and Bradley trap the German armies.  Or it could more or less stand pat, denying the German armies retreating from the Ruhr a place to make a last-ditch stand, while providing the armies of Patton and Patch a friendly enclave toward which to advance. Conceivably, so vast an Allied army landing so deep inside Germany could of itself cause the complete collapse of the Third Reich. 

Ridgway had first learned about ARENA three days before, on March 3, in a meeting with Floyd Parks and Eisenhower's G-3, Harold R.  (Pink) Bull. At that time, Parks had sketched a rough outline of the plan and had told Ridgway and Bull that Brereton intended to lay the whole thing out for Eisenhower within a few days. Ridgway had been astounded-and not a little put out. Brereton had promised to keep him abreast of FAAA planning; he had told Parks that he, Ridgway, should have been thoroughly briefed on ARENA before Brereton took such a plan to Eisenhower. 

Digging further into the plan over the next few days, Ridgway learned more details, FAAA intended, if possible, to utilize all six Allied airborne divisions (the American 13th, 17th, 82nd and 101st, and the British 1st and 6th) in the assault phase. These would be followed into the airhead by four regular divisions: Walter Robertson's 2nd, Alex Bolling's 84th, Tony McAuliffe's 103rd and one other (as yet undesignated). There would be three corps:  XVIII Airborne, I British Airborne and one other for the regular infantry divisions. Maximum FAAA airlift would be utilized with all aircraft making two round trips a day from bases in France and Belgium. In addition, masses of Eighth Air Force heavy bombers would help fly in supplies at the rate of three hundred tons per division per day-that is, building to a total of three thousand tons per day. 

Despite his initial pique, Ridgway, like all airborne officers who were briefed on ARENA, was electrified by its scope and daring and fully endorsed it. However, he had several major reservations. Chief among these was the use of British airborne forces.  By then he knew that Dempsey intended to hang on to Bois's 6th Airborne Division for the encirclement of the Ruhr, and he was certain that Montgomery (hard-pressed for troops) would not willingly release it.  The British had not pushed hard for the restaffing of the 1st Airborne Division after Arnhem. Ridgway doubted it could be fleshed out and trained in time by May 1, the date originally proposed for ARENA.  In view of these factors, he suggested that ARENA be carried out strictly with American troops-with the airborne assault composed of the four American divisions organized into a single corps-his XVIII Airborne. However, Brereton vetoed this proposal, intending to do his utmost to bring the British 1st and 6th divisions (as well as Gale's 1 British Airborne Corps) into the operations. 

When Eisenhower was first apprised of ARENA, he, too, was enthusiastic. Perhaps recalling his long-standing promises to Marshall and Arnold, he commented that he "would dearly love to have one big airborne operation before the war ended” and thought ARENA “would really be fun to do."  But he insisted that it be international in makeup-that the British airborne forces be used. He cabled the British high command in London requesting transfer of the British 6th Airborne Division to ARENA and a crash program to get the British 1st Airborne Division ready in time. He cabled Marshall in Washington to ask if it was possible to pry a regular infantry division from Mark Clark in Italy to serve as the fourth regular airlanded infantry division. Thus it transpired that while Ridgway and XVIII Airborne Corps were fine- tuning the VARSITY plan, they were simultaneously working up detailed plans not only for CHOKER II but for ARENA as well. None of these plans was ever "final," but for several weeks the best solution seemed to be to scale CHOKER II down and assigned to Gerry Chapman’s 13th Division and carry out ARENA with the 17th, 82nd and 101st divisions plus whatever British airborne troops London could-or would-make available. In any event, in the face of the challenge and promise of ARENA, VARSITY became increasingly insignificant, and Ridgway, more than ever, must have been disappointed at being saddled with it.

[source: Blair, "Ridgeway's Paratroopers" (NY: Doubleday, 1985)]

General James Gavin’s “On to Berlin" as a start.  He related therein that he was tasked with formulating the airborne infantry portion of a plan to create an air-head in Berlin, based on Templehoff airdrome.  The idea was to emulate certain operations of a similar nature carried out in the Pacific Theater of Operations.  That is, an initial paradrop was designed to secure for a short time an airfield or even merely a long flat stretch of land capable of landing aircraft. This would be followed by as massive a reinforcement in terms of troops, artillery, fuel and ammunition as time and air transport allowed, and thence to be supported by a column of columns of ground troops which would join up with the paras.

Gavin believed the entire operation to be Top secret. A Soviet officer later disabused him of the notion, however, as the Soviets, the officer indicated, had penetrated the planning almost from its inception. It is interesting that during this time, General Eisenhower had told Stalin through his military representatives in Moscow that as far as he was concerned, Berlin was no longer a target of any importance, and consequently he had no plans to move on that city.  I am not sure that Stalin was amused when he was so told, but it is a fact that upon hearing this claim, he authorized two Red Army commanders to push On To Berlin, Right Now.

It Would have committed western Allied troops to a useless "race" with the Soviets over a city no longer of importance other than for propaganda purposes, (and which also was clearly to be within the Soviet area of responsibility once hostilities had ended); would have led to ridiculous casualties among the forces committed, and may even have prolonged the war. This was one planned operation about which the Allied High Command should feel relieved did not go forward. 

The 101st never "almost jumped on Berlin"!  By spring 1945, the XVIII Corps and 82nd were in ground role in northern Germany and greeted D-Day in Lubeck area. Meanwhile, the 101st was in a similar role in Bavaria -- hence unavailable for ANY jump mission.  Late war missions in the ETO would have fallen to the 17th and 13th; 13th had two drops seriously planned, both in SW Germany, but Patton's guys and then the French overran the objectives sooner than expected and the missions were scrubbed.  A joint Brit-US-POLISH Airborne Operation west of Berlin (area of Letzlinger Heide -- a Cold War Soviet training area) was considered, but called off because the Soviets would view it as cheating -- THEY wanted Berlin as their own, for revenge/glory -- and as a first step to the Western Allies turning against the USSR (as Nazi propaganda said).

The idea sprang from General Brereton's First Airborne Army staff, and was seen as involving the US 13th and 17th, the British 6th and remnants of the 1st, the Polish Airborne Brigade, AND at least one US conventional Infantry Division that would be airlanded in follow-up phases.  British were against it; the Poles wanted to jump into Berlin itself.  Other factors were the prospect of having to deal with/supply/feed tens of thousands of German POW's and civilians -- and Brereton's bright idea of diverting the 8th Air Force heavies to cargo drops was not greeted happily.  In short, an Airborne Operations against Berlin was never more than a pipedream.

#

'Almost' is an arguable term, but in early March of 1945 the 82nd airborne and the 101st airborne divisions were being held in army reserve for Operation Eclipse.  This was a contingency plan in case the Nazi government fell -- they would be parachuted into Berlin to secure the city. The divisions were not happy being held in reserve for a contingency, and on March 13 Eisenhower came up with a plan that had both divisions parachuting into Kassel to form an airhead, into which another 3-4 other divisions would be flown.  Omar Bradley came up with a long list of objections, however, and the plan was shelved. Chapter 43 of Bradley's autobiography “A General's Life" has an account.

The history of the 101st, Rendezvous With Destiny, makes a four-line reference to ECLIPSE, in a paragraph on its “...broad training program…on a six-week schedule…for readiness for ...a mission...ECLIPSE".  This training began on 5 March, so would not have ended until late April.  No further mention is made of it or planning for it, and the Division was instead shipped out to the Ruhr as groundlings on 1 April. Other books consulted -- Ridgway's Paratroopers by Clay Blair, Airborne Album, and the official USAF Historical Series No 97: Airborne Operations in WWII, European Theater, make no mention of ECLIPSE, yet they all refer to Operation CHOKER II (13th, Worms-Mainz, on or about 22 March), EFFECTIVE (13th, south of Stuttgart in support of Seventh Army advance, for 22 April) (both scrubbed due to ground armies making unexpected headway) and ARENA (Brereton's piece de resistance with all possible [4 to 6] US and Brit Airborne Divisions, the Polish Brigade filling out the decimated British 1st Airborne, and the US 2nd, 84th, 103rd and one TBD Infantry Divisions airlanded, all 8th AF dedicated to support, in Kassel area, on or about 1 May). I'll doubt that ECLIPSE was ever taken seriously below the SHAEF/FAA level.

In September 1944 Eisenhower stated that his main target was Berlin. As  late as in March 1945 there were plans for the 101st Airborne Division to seize Gatow airfield, and to my knowledge the 82nd was to seize Tempelhof and a British airborne brigade the Heinkel works (all in Berlin of course). On 31 March Eisenhower made suddenly public that Berlin was only a geographic item, his aim was the destruction of the enemy. Montgomery seemed surprised and called that a terrible error. It seems that Churchill was of the same opinion. Mid-April Eisenhower ordered the 13th Airborne Division from the US to Europe; their task seemed to be the German Alps. On 21 April, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell-Smith, said in a press conference that although there was no certainty about the National Redout, it was the main problem just now, and eventually the help of the Soviets was needed to seize it. 3 days later, Bradley said that the Alpine Redoubt required at least a further month of fighting, if not a whole year.

Operation EclipseMemorandum