The Allies wanted to hold the island of Crete as the site of
an air base from which bombing raids against the Ploesti oilfields, vital to
the German war machine, could be launched. However, the demands of other fronts
left Crete weakly garrisoned by just 35,000 men (British, Commonwealth, and
Greek troops), poorly armed and subject to noncohesive command. Moreover, the
harsh, mountainous terrain of Crete impeded defense. Artillery and air support
were virtually nil.
On May 20, German paratroops of Fliegerkorps 11, under
General Kurt Student, landed at both ends of Crete. The Allies responded by
broadcasting defenders across the island, spreading them thin. For their part,
the Germans had underestimated the size of the island’s garrison and had to
call for reinforcements from the island of Milos. The troop transports were
either dispersed or sunk by British air and sea attacks. Despite this blow to
the attackers, the paratroopers managed to take the airfield at Maleme, which
quickly turned the tide hopelessly against the defenders.
On May 26, Lt. Gen Sir Bernard Freyberg, in command of the
garrison, reported that his position was untenable. After securing permission
to evacuate, he ordered a retreat on May 27 to Sphakia while troops at
Heraklion were quickly evacuated by British warships. The defenders of the
Retimo airfield were cut off and captured. In the meantime, the main force, at
Sphakia, fell under heavy air attack, and the evacuation ships were pummeled.
Three cruisers and six destroyers were sunk, and 17 other vessels were damaged.
By May 30, the evacuation had to be aborted, leaving 5,000 men still on the
island. Most of these were doomed to capture, but a small body escaped to join
the Cretan resistance and were active until the German withdrawal from Crete in
1944.
After the Allied evacuation, Italian troops were sent to
occupy the eastern Cretan provinces of Siteia and Lasitho while German troops
held the rest of the island. Total losses at the Battle of Crete were 1,742
British, Greek, and Commonwealth troops killed, 2,225 wounded, and 11,370
captured. Royal Navy losses were some 2,000 men killed and 183 wounded. Losses
to the Germans testified to the ferocity of the Allied defense: 7,000 were
killed. Viewed by Adolf Hitler as a Pyrrhic victory, the Battle of Crete
persuaded him to ban further Airborne Assaults as too costly, and, for the rest
of the war, the Germans never launched another major paratroop operation.
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The fight for Crete, the biggest operation of German
airborne forces actually employed from the air, was over. It was as if a
revolution had occurred, and no one has described that better and in more
precise terms than Major General J. F. C. Fuller:
Of all of the
operations of the war, the attack from the air on Crete was by far the leader
when it came to audaciousness. Neither before or afterwards was something
similar attempted.
It was not an air
attack but rather an attack from the air. The fighting was also not decided in
the air. Instead, it was decided on the ground and without the support of a
land army.
Its most salient
feature was the aerial transport and the lifting of an army in the air. Just
like the Battle of Cambray in 1917, this attack signaled a revolution in
tactics.
The fighting on Crete, which also turned out to be the main
aerial employment of the airborne corps in the entire war, was legitimized, in
the final analysis, by this praise. But the consequences that Crete had for the
German airborne corps were so important and so decisive that this operation had
to be presented in great detail. Let us examine some of the consequences of
this operation.
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE CRETE OPERATION
It is difficult for me
to write about the Battle for Crete. For me, as the commander of the German
air-landed forces that conquered Crete, this name is a bitter memory. I
miscalculated when I recommended this attack, and this not only meant the loss
of many paratroopers, who were my sons, but also, in the end, the death of the
German airborne force, which I had personally created.
That was the conclusion drawn by Student after the war. What
happened after Crete? Crete was considered a grandiose victory of the airborne
corps. It was also, at the same time, the defeat of the same. Once again,
Student:
On 19 July, on the occasion of the presentation of the
Knight’s Cross recipients for the Crete Operation at the Führer Headquarters in
Rastenburg, Hitler said to me:
“Crete proved that the
days of the airborne corps are over! Airborne forces are a weapon of surprise.
Your surprise factor has since worn out.”
He had the highest words of praise for the performance of
the men. Over the next few months, I would feel the greater import of those
words of Hitler’s, when the airborne forces were sent to Russia as ground
forces.
Some of the airborne forces still on Crete and others
returned to their peacetime garrisons on Germany, where they were greeted with
great jubilation, when the war with the Soviet Union started.
For instance, the III./FJR 1 heard the special report
concerning the start of Barbarossa as it was crossing the Danube south of
Budapest on its way to the Wildflecken Training Area, where the entire regiment
was to be given some rest and be reconstituted.
The General Staff of the Army and the Führer Headquarters as
well seemed to focus on the losses sustained in the taking of Crete. The Reich
Air Ministry was shocked by the amount of transport aircraft that had been shot
down or crash landed, even though the considerably smaller operations over
Holland had cost more machines. But the loss of 143 Ju 52’s, not including 8
that disappeared without a trace (presumably lost at sea) and 121 damaged
aircraft was a number that cut to the quick.
Soon there were more than enough advice givers who attempted
to convince Hitler that the employment of airborne forces was something akin to
a lottery. Hitler allowed himself to be convinced by this whispering campaign,
especially since he also considered the losses at Crete too high and did not
want to initiate another operation that was so doubtful. He directed that the
paratroopers were to be employed in the Soviet Union on the ground.
That might have worked well if the entire airborne force had
been employed as an organic whole. Instead, however, the forces were split up
into small contingents and employed piecemeal on different parts of the front.
Further reading: Beevor, Antony. Crete: The Battle and the
Resistance. Denver: Westview Press, 1994; Forty, George. Battle of Crete.
Hersham, U.K.: Ian Allan, 2002; Shores, Christopher, Brian Cull, and Nicola
Malizia. Air War for Yugoslavia Greece and Crete 1940–41. London: Grub Street,
1993; Willingham, Matthew. Perilous Commitments: Britain’s Involvement in
Greece and Crete 1940–41. London: Spellmount, 2004.
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