The very visible French failure on the
Western Front was followed by the glories of the Battle of Britain. From the
summer into the early autumn, RAF fighters based in southern England destroyed
50 per cent more enemy bombers and fighters than they lost. The resulting defeat
of the Luftwaffe by the RAF in the summer of 1940 was in many respects the
culmination of steady planning in air defence over many years. One crucial
aspect was completely unexpected and unprepared for – the famous dog-fights
between Spitfires, Hurricanes, Messerschmitt 109s and 110s. Fighters were
expected to intercept bombers, not deal with other fighters. Dog-fights were
regarded as things of the past, specifically of the Western Front in the Great
War. Otherwise it was a triumph of system and organization, of radar, of
observers, of command and control systems. British victory was not, however,
the result of what are usually taken as British values triumphing over what are
taken to be German or Nazi values. If any air force conformed to the usual
image of how British fighters operated – a matter of improvisation and
individualism – it was not the RAF but the Luftwaffe. If one of the forces was
organized with Teutonic efficiency and regimentation, it was the RAF, not the
Luftwaffe.
The pacifist writer Vera Brittain noted in
1940 that ‘The bombers have a heavy, massive hum, quite different from the
lighter, more casual-sounding British machines. All the difference between the
Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon temperaments seemed to lie in those two familiar
noises.’ For all the propagandistic image of the Germans destroying Warsaw and
then Rotterdam from the air, the commitment to the bombing of cities was a
British rather than a Nazi phenomenon. British bombing of Germany was not in
retaliation for the Blitz, a case of the Germans reaping the whirlwind they had
sown. It predated not only the Blitz, but also the Battle of Britain. Bomber
Command launched the first general bombing offensive against cities in the war
on 11 May 1940. The Luftwaffe was prohibited from bombing cities not in the
front line. It was not till September 1940 that Hitler allowed the Luftwaffe to
start British-style bombing of Britain, following the bombing of Berlin.
There was no shortage of new aircraft in
Britain in 1940. Modern types had been in production for years, and just as
importantly gigantic new factories were ready to increase production. In 1940
Britain out-produced Germany in aircraft, just as the propagandists stated.
Even the high level of production before May 1940 was not deemed enough. One of
Churchill’s very first acts on becoming Prime Minister was to create a new
Ministry of Aircraft Production, under Lord Beaverbrook. Beaverbrook wanted a
rapid increase in production, and issued appeals to workers and managers. More
importantly he decided to give special priority to five types already in
quantity production. On 15 May representatives of the Ministry of Aircraft
Production agreed that at least until the end of September 1940 all efforts
were to be concentrated on the production of Wellingtons, Whitley Vs, Blenheims,
Hurricanes and Spitfires. We may note that three of these types were bombers,
instruments of offence. The priority was over by October 1940. Indeed, we have
the testimony of the Director of Engine Production that ministry officials and
people from industry were pushing Beaverbrook hard to rescind the order. At a
meeting on the matter in late June an unmovable Beaverbrook was called away to
Downing Street to be told of the French capitulation. He returned to the
ministry late at night and agreed to the plan to reintroduce production of new
types, such was the continuing confidence in victory.
One of the main aims of the rearmament
programmes was to build up a powerful air force which could bomb Germany. Big
twin-engined bombers like the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden were built,
aeroplanes at least as powerful as the Heinkels and Junkers of the Germans.
Despite enormous efforts and expenditures these programmes were, as of 1940–41,
failures. The British bombers soon discovered they had to fly at night because
air defence was more effective than had been envisaged. Flying at night meant
they rarely found their targets. Far from being capable of delivering a
knock-out blow, they caused minimal damage to Germany. It is difficult to find
a similar example of such a catastrophic failure of a new technical system on
this scale. For the enthusiast for counterfactuals this raises the question:
what if all the effort that had been devoted to the bombers had gone into tanks
or rifles? A prescient prime minister might have done exactly that in the late
1930s. It is sometimes in effect suggested that the British government of 1938
was indeed prescient in anticipating 1940, but not in this sense. The idea is
that Chamberlain wisely appeased and delayed war until Britain had enough
Spitfires and radar gear to win the Battle of Britain. But using Spitfires and
radar in the summer of 1940 stemmed from the military disaster which might not
have happened if other policies had been followed.
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